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Introduction
Productivity often depends on acquired skills as much as on e¤ort. Or, as the saying goes, practice makes perfect. The importance of learning-by-doing has long been recognized in the literature on human capital. 1 Yet, its implications for agency problems remain largely unexplored. Is it necessary to link wages more tightly to performances when the agent's action determines her future productivity? More generally, is human capital accumulation reinforcing or weakening the power of incentives? A formal treatment of these questions has been hindered by the fact that e¤ort today has an impact on the stock of human capital, and so matters for the distribution of output in all future periods. When actions are hidden, a deviation will generate persistent private information. Consider, for example, an agent that provides less e¤ort than expected. Not only will her productivity today be lower than anticipated by the principal, but she will also carry less skills into next period. In other words, the agent will be less optimistic about her future prospects. This is why excluding one shot deviations is not enough to establish whether or not a contract is incentive compatible. Due to the persistent e¤ect of past actions, one also has to exclude multiple deviations. A general treatment of the problem would therefore involve keeping track of all the possible strategies. But more often than not, such a direct approach is impractical as the state space quickly becomes unbounded. 2 We circumvent these di¢ culties by using a continuous time approach and by establishing full incentive compatibility. That is we focus on the conjectured equilibrium and characterize the agent's …rst-order condition. Then we derive a su¢ cient condition under which a contract that satis…es the …rst-order condition is also fully incentive compatible. In other words, we identify a requirement such that multiple deviations are never profitable when local deviations are suboptimal. The su¢ ciency condition ensures that the solution of the relaxed problem subject to the …rst-order constraint is also a solution of the original incentive problem.
We characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for general time-separable preferences. An action satis…es the …rst-order condition when its marginal cost is equal to the current pay-performance sensitivity plus the appropriately discounted sum of future sensitivities. The …rst component is standard and corresponds to the solution in , where the agent cannot accumulate human capital. Speci…c to our problem is the addition of future sensitivities: A positive deviation in e¤ort increases the stock of human capital which raises expected output in all periods. From the principal's standpoint, this creates a series of output surprises whose returns in utils are by de…nition proportional to the sensitivity coe¢ cients. Since performance and pay are positively correlated, it follows that the value of private information is also positive. Hence, learning-by-doing strengthens the power of incentives by relaxing the incentive constraint. The agent adds the bene…ts of higher skills in the future to the current returns, which makes her more eager to provide e¤ort.
In order to go further than the description of the incentive constraints, we analyze the optimal contract when agents have CARA utility. This speci…cation allows us to solve for the optimal contract in closed form because it neutralizes the wealth e¤ect. The solution con…rms the insights gathered from the analysis of the …rst-order condition: Human capital accumulation lowers the cost of incentives provision, thereby reducing the distance between the Pareto frontier and the …rst-best allocation. The principal is able to o¤er better insurance so that wages becomes less tightly linked to performances when the agent learns by doing.
Related literature. This paper is closely related to the companion paper by Jovanovic and Prat (2013) which studies incentive contracts when the agent's type is initially unknown but gradually revealed over time. 3 The learning process also leads to persistent private information because the agent can manipulate the principal's beliefs by providing a di¤erent level of e¤ort than expected. In contrast with learning-by-doing, the value of private information is negative: Following a negative deviation from the recommended action, the agent becomes more optimistic about her type than the principal. This is why learning weakens the power of incentives whereas human capital strengthens it. More generally, this paper belongs to a burgeoning strand of research that uses continuous time techniques to study the design of dynamic incentives in environments featuring persistent information. The seminal paper on the issue is Williams (2011) . It studies a reporting problem with a persistent hidden state. Williams also uses a …rst-order approach to derive the incentive constraints but our proof di¤ers: Whereas his approach relies on the stochastic maximum principle, we use instead a variational argument originally proposed by Cvitanić et al. (2009) .
For concreteness, we are interpreting our source of persistency as arising from human capital accumulation. But this is actually a restrictive interpretation. Given the partial equilibrium nature of our analysis, nothing prevents reader from favoring alternative mechanism. For example, one may think of the long-run impact that CEO's actions have on …rm performance. This is precisely the interpretation favored by Sannikov (2012) in its recent paper about long-run incentives. Aside from deriving similar incentive constraints, Sannikov proposes to replace the original state variables by their Lagrange multipliers. He uses this method to characterize contracts when the agent's utility is separable in consumption and leisure. The model shows that optimal payments can be postponed beyond the termination of the relationship.
Outline of the paper. The structure of the problem is described in Section 2. We present the …rst-order approach in Section 3 where we derive both necessary and su¢ cient conditions. In Section 4, we restrict our attention to agents with CARA utility. We derive the principal's value function in closed-form and characterize the dynamics of wages. Section 5 concludes whereas the proofs of the Propositions and Corollaries are relegated to the Appendix.
The Contracting Problem
Technology.-The agent's e¤ort a t 2 A R has two e¤ects. First, it raises output in the current period. This immediate bene…t is followed by a permanent one, as agents learn by doing. E¤ort adds to the stock of human capital h which evolves as follows
This speci…cation accounts for the natural obsolescence of skills as h decreases at the rate . In order to o¤set the depreciation of her human capital, the agent has to provide some e¤ort whose return in units of human capital is assumed to be linear. Thus the cumulative 4 output Y t produced by the agent up to time t obeys the following dynamic
where Z t is a standard Brownian Motion. Productivity is therefore given by the sum of e¤ort plus the stock of human capital. The agent knows both her action and skill level. By contrast, the principal only observes output and the noisiness of the technology prevents him from observing the action taken by the agent as well as her skill level.
Contract.-We analyze long-term contracts that last until date T and whose payments w t can depend on the output history fY s ; s 2 [0; T ]g in an arbitrary way. More formally, let ( ; F; P ) denote the probability space on which the Brownian motion Z is de…ned. Since output paths are random elements of the space ; w : [0; T ] ! R is a mapping that associates a wage to any event ! 2 : The information available to the principal does not include e¤ort. It is therefore restricted to the …ltration F , and so the mapping w must be F Y measurable.
Preferences.-The agent chooses her e¤ort and receives the ‡ow utility u (w t ; a t ) in return. We assume that the instantaneous utility function u (w; a) 2 C 2;2 (R A). Preferences are time additive with discount rate > 0 so that the agent's preferences as of time
with terminal utility U (W ) 2 C 1 (R) : The principal is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the discounted ‡ow of output net of wages and terminal payment. The optimal contract w and agent's strategy a are therefore chosen so as to optimize the principal's expected pro…t
under the expectation E a associated to the agent's strategy. Maximization is performed subject to the participation constraint at time 0, i.e., E a [U 0 ] U for an exogenously given U; and to the incentive constraint U Eâ [U 0 ] for all feasible strategiesâ: The incentive constraint is too general to be handled analytically. We explain in the following section how it implies a necessary condition that can be used to characterize incentive compatible strategies.
Incentive Constraints
We use a …rst-order approach to determine whether strategies are incentive compatible. We assume that the agent has not deviated in the past and derive a necessary condition under which local deviations cannot be optimal. Then we generalize the analysis to arbitrary strategies and obtain a su¢ cient conditions which can be combined with the necessary condition to establish optimality of the agent's strategy, under both local and global deviations. This second step is crucial because the stock of human capital depends on past actions. Because of this persistence, excluding local deviation does not ensure that agents will not use multiple deviations.
Necessary condition
The agent chooses her e¤ort so as to maximize her continuation value
As explained before, the earning process w t depends on the whole output path and is therefore non-Markovian. The optimal control of non Markovian processes can be analyzed using a martingale approach. Intuitively, one can think of the agent as controlling the distribution of outputs, and consequently wages, through his choice of e¤ort. This is formally equivalent to choosing the probability measure over realizations of w t and has the advantage that the Radon-Nikodym derivative associated to a given e¤ort path is Markovian, which renders the problem amenable to standard optimization techniques.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique decomposition of the agent's continuation value
where is a square integrable process. The necessary condition for a t to be an optimal control reads
for all a 2 A:
When e¤ort is positive and the necessary condition binds, (6) is equivalent to
which basically ensures that marginal costs and marginal returns are identical. The marginal costs of an additional unit of e¤ort is equal to u a (w t ; a t ) : Its bene…ts are twofold. First, the technology of production is such that e¤ort raises the output ‡ow one for one.
The bene…t in utils of such an increase is by de…nition equal to t ; since it measures the sensitivity of the promised value with respect to output. There is also a second e¤ect due to the persistent impact that e¤ort has on the stock of human capital. One more unit of e¤ort today raises the -periods ahead value of h; and thus output, by exp( ). As for the future bene…ts, their value in utils is obtained multiplying the output shift by the expected value of . Discounting all these future gains at rate and summing them, one obtains the integral on the right hand side of (7).
To see that human capital strengthens the power of incentives, it is instructive to let diverges to in…nity. Then agents cannot accumulate any human capital because their stock of knowledge immediately depreciates. The integral in (7) converges to zero and we recover the standard incentive constraint in . The integral converges to zero from above because incentives can be positive solely if > 0. It follows that in order to implement a given e¤ort a t at a given wage w t , the sensitivity coe¢ cient t with full depreciation must be higher. In other words, contracts without human capital accumulation link pay more tightly to performance, which lowers the welfare of the riskaverse agent.
s ds i denote the value of private information. It admits a unique decomposition
where # is a square integrable process. A control a t is incentive compatible if (6) and
are true for almost all t 2 [0; T ] :
Condition (10) is su¢ cient but not necessary: A contract might violate it and be nonetheless fully incentive compatible. It cannot be checked before solving for the contract since w t ; a t and # t are all endogenous. But one can use (10) ex-post, that is once a contract satisfying the relaxed condition (6) has been identi…ed. We show in the next section how the whole procedure works when the agent's utility function is CARA.
Incentive Contracts under CARA Utility
We assume that the agent's per-period utility is CARA u(w; a) = exp( (w a)) ; with 2 (0; 1) ; > 0;
and a 2 A = (0; 1] : CARA utility functions have the advantage of ruling out wealth e¤ects. The parameter measures the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the agent, while the requirement that < 1 ensures that maximal e¤ort a = 1 is also the …rst best action. In order to focus on incentive providing contracts, we exclude 0 from the set A of implementable actions. We introduce later the possibility to retire the agent and derive the condition under which it is optimal to terminate incentives provision. For tractability, we let the contracting horizon T diverges to in…nity. 5 The principal's 5 The solution of the in…nite horizon problem is also the limit of a sequence of …nite horizons problems. Following the same steps as in Jovanovic and Prat (2013) , one can show that, when the terminal utility U (W T ) = exp ( W T ), the pro…ts derived from incentives contracts with horizon T converge as T ! 1 to the solution of the in…nite horizon problem. This constructive approach circumvents the lack of mutually absolutely continuous measure in the limit. 
subject to the incentive constraint u a (w t ; a t ) = t + p t ;
and the laws of motion of the state variable
along with their transversality conditions,
We relegate the derivations to the Appendix and report the expression of the expected wage bill in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 It is optimal to set a t = 1 for all t: The expected wage bill of the optimal contract can be expressed as a function of the promised value v only. It reads
The constant C is equal to
where k is the unique positive root of the cubic equation
To see why the expected wage bill does not depend on p, replace the incentive constraint into the law of motion (12) to obtain dp t = [( + + 1) p t + u a (w t ; a t )] dt + # t dZ t :
The state variable p is therefore equivalent to
Under our CARA speci…cation, marginal and total utilities are proportional as u a ( ) = u ( ). We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that this property ensures that the ratio p t =v t remains constant over time. This is why the promised value encapsulates all the relevant information.
Expected pro…ts directly follow from the wage bill as
Given that e¤ort remains equal to 1, the stock of human capital h t = 1 e t = is deterministic and gradually converges to its steady-state level h , lim t!1 h t = 1= : By contrast, the expected wage bill evolves stochastically so as to satisfy the promise keeping constraint. To understand the intuition behind (13), consider …rst the term involving the promised value:
ln ( v) = : Given the speci…cation (11) of the utility function, the cost of delivering value v through a constant income stream is equal to ln ( v) = , whereas compensates the disutility incurred by the agent for providing full e¤ort. Hence, ln ( v) = is equal to wages in …rst best environments where the principal is able to perfectly insure the agent. But this implies that C measures the perperiod costs of incentive provision or, in other words, the loss induced by the information problem. Perhaps surprisingly, the loss does not depend on the level of the promised value. This feature is due to the CARA speci…cation and its lack of wealth e¤ect, which implies that incentives provision does not become costlier as the agent gets richer.
It is not immediately clear how the constant C varies with the model's parameters, mostly because it depends on the root of a cubic equation. We show in the Appendix that the root k always exists, is unique and decreasing in the rate of decay of human capital . As C is increasing in k, Corollary 1 immediately follows.
Corollary 1 The expected wage bill B (v) is increasing in .
The less persistent human capital is, the higher the costs of motivating the agent. In particular, it is always more expensive to induce full e¤ort when there is no human capital accumulation, i.e., when diverges to in…nity. This is in line with our discussion of the …rst order condition (7) at the end of Section 3. incentive constraint because agents add future output gains to the immediate bene…t of e¤ort provision. Figure 1 illustrates our …nding. It depicts the per-period costs C of incentive provision as a function of and : The costs are increasing in output volatility because it lowers the signal/noise ratio. This makes it more di¢ cult to identify shirkers which raises the costs of eliciting e¤ort. The information problem vanishes as goes to zero because the the principal can perfectly infer the actual level of e¤ort. Since C measures the distance from the …rst best contract, its value converges to zero with : Turning our attention to , we see that Corollary 1 is indeed con…rmed by the simulation: Losses are unambiguously increasing in .
Wage dynamics.
-It is instructive to analyze how wages evolve over time in order to understand why the cost of delivering a given promised value is decreasing in the persistence of human capital. It is shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that the sensitivity of the promised value reads
Since @k=@ < 0; it is clear that @ =@ > 0: The less persistent human capital is, the more volatile the continuation value. This is why the expected wage bill has to be higher in order to compensate the agent for her greater exposure to risk. We can also characterize the e¤ect that has on the drift of v. Reinserting optimal wages w(v) = ln( kv)= + into (4), we …nd that
The trend is negative 7 which shows that the principal …nds it optimal to frontload transfers. This process of immiserization is common in models of full commitment with CARA utility. More interestingly, the drift coe¢ cient is decreasing in as @k=@ < 0: Learningby-doing counteracts the agent's immiserization. It become more pro…table to backload payments when actions have a persistent e¤ect because agents take these future bene…ts into account, which relax the incentive constraint. However, since is superior to k even when = 0, the immiserization channel always dominates.
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In order to derive similar insights for wages, we apply Ito's lemma to w(v) = ln( kv)= + and …nd that w t obeys
As expected, wages ‡uctuate more when v is volatile, that is when is higher. By contrast, the impact of on the deterministic component of the wage schedule turns out to be ambiguous. As discussed above, human capital persistence creates some backloading which directly raises the coe¢ cient of the drift. But it also lowers the volatility of v and, since wages are convex in v, this puts some downward pressure on wages. The simulation reported in Figure 2 illustrates that, for some parameter values, the drift of w can be increasing in because of the volatility channel.
Full Incentive Compatibility.-We have used the relaxed incentive problem to derive optimal contracts. We still have to establish that they satisfy, not only the …rst order condition, but also the global incentive constraint. As stated in the following Corollary, this is indeed the case. 
Corollary 2
The contract described in Proposition 3 is fully incentive compatible because it satis…es both necessary and su¢ cient conditions, (7) and (10) respectively.
One should expect that full incentive compatibility is ensured for high enough because the model converges to a standard contracting problem without persistence. Then we know from the work of Schättler and Sung (1993) that, as long as the …rst order condition is ful…lled, global optimality in continuous time settings without persistence is not an issue. Recent papers by Williams (2011) or Jovanovic and Prat (2013) show that this is not anymore true when actions have a lasting e¤ect. One usually has to impose a bound on the degree of persistence in order to exclude multiple deviations. Interestingly enough, such restrictions are not required in our model, at least when is restricted to positive values so that the e¤ect of e¤ort do not cumulate over time. Determining whether this result is due to the particular structure of our model, or to a more general property arising from the complementarity between e¤ort and persistence, is an interesting issue whose resolution we leave for further research.
Retirement.-The principal may decide to retire the agent instead of paying the compensation required to extract e¤ort. Retirement is pro…table when the condition below is satis…ed.
Corollary 3 When 1 + 1= ( + ) < C, it is optimal to retire the agent. Otherwise, the contract described in Proposition 3 dominates retirement.
When the condition holds with equality, the cost of compensating the agent for an additional unit of e¤ort equals the expected return. To see why, observe that the cheapest way to deliver the promised value is to pay the constant stream ln ( v) = . It follows from the expression in Proposition 3 that the ‡ow cost of incentive provision with respect to retirement is equal to C + : It is measured against the discounted return of one unit of e¤ort 1 + 1= ( + ). But Corollary 3 is not solely static: It also excludes stopping times, so that the principal will never require e¤ort exertion for a while and then retire the agent.
As one should expect, learning-by-doing renders retirement less attractive. The noise parameter has the opposite e¤ect because it raises jCj. Actually, since C diverges with , there always exists an output variance above which retirement dominates. By contrast, the e¤ect of on C is bounded from below by the solution prevailing in the absence of human capital accumulation.
Conclusion
We have derived the necessary condition that any dynamic contract has to satisfy when agents learn by doing. A signi…cant bene…t of using a continuous time approach is that it also delivers a su¢ cient condition which ensures that the contract is fully incentive compatible. We showed that, when the agent's utility is CARA, su¢ ciency is not an issue as long as the impact of e¤ort does not build up over time.
This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on dynamic contracts with persistent information. Research on such problems is still at an early development stage, but recent breakthroughs suggest that it may soon become useful for the analysis of empirical data. For example, our model predicts that income volatility increases when human capital accumulation becomes more di¢ cult or less relevant. Hence, introducing a …nite lifetime or a concave learning technology leads to rising wage volatility over the lifecycle, as documented in, e.g., Gibbons and Murphy (1992) .
Enriching the model proposed in this paper also promises to improve our understanding of actual contracts. An interesting but demanding extension would combine hidden types with learning-by-doing. In such an environment, actions serve two purposes: Apart from building up future skills, e¤ort establishes the agent's reputation. Both motives are particularly important for young workers. But the companion paper Jovanovic and Prat (2013) shows that reputational concerns and learning-by-doing have opposite e¤ects on the power of incentives. The tension is likely to di¤er across occupations and could therefore helps explaining the variety of contractual arrangements observed in reality.
APPENDIX
Proof. Proposition 1: Consider the Brownian motion Z 0 under some probability space with probability measure Q, and let
denote the suitably augmented …ltration generated by Z 0 . Let
so that Y t is also a Brownian motion under Q. Since expected output is linear in cumulative output, the exponential local martingale 
Adopting a weak formulation allows us to view the choice of control a as determining the probability measure Q a . In order to de…ne the agent's optimization problem, let R a (t) denote the reward from time t onwards so that
where the output path is denoted by Y and, with a slight abuse of notation, u (s; Y ; a s ) , e s u (w (Y ) ; a s ) and U (T; Y ) , e T U (Y ) are utilities at time t discounted from time 0.
The agent's objective is to …nd an admissible control process that maximizes the expected reward E a [R a (0)] over all admissible controls a 2 A. In other words, the agent solves the following problem
The objective function can be recast as
where the operator E a [ ] and E [ ] are expectations under the probability measure Q a and Q, respectively. One can see from (16) that varying a is indeed equivalent to changing the probability measure. The key advantage of the weak formulation is that, under the reference measure Q, the output process does not depend on a. Hence, we can treat it as …xed which enables us to solve our problem in spite of its non-Markovian structure. 
Step 1: We …rst characterize the variations of the agent's objective with respect to "
To obtain the limit of the …rst term as " goes to zero, observe that
As shown in Cvitanić et al. (2009), for any " 2 [0; " 0 ), this expression is integrable uniformly with respect to " and so
The limit of the second term reads
Due to the uniform integrability of a t;T R a " (t) R a (t) =", the expectation is also well de…ned. Combining the two expressions above, we …nally obtain
Step 2: We are now in a position to derive the necessary condition. Consider total earnings as of date 0
By de…nition, it is a Q a martingale. According to the extended Martingale Representation 
This decomposition allows us to solve for rV a (t). Reinserting (17), (18) and (19) into
where subscripts denote derivatives and arguments are omitted for brevity. Given the law of motion (22), applying Ito's rule to the …rst term yields
Hence rV a (t) can be represented as
Given that 2 s is square integrable, 11 we have
As for the deterministic 10 The additional expectation term vanishes because both rA s and a s are bounded and so
11 Square integrability of term, collecting the e¤ect of each perturbation a s yields
Finally, noticing that a s was arbitrary, optimality of a t requires that
We now rewrite the necessary condition as a function of the volatility of the promised value v t . Di¤erentiating (21) with respect to time yields
so that
Replacing t = e t t into (23) and collecting the exponential terms, one obtains the necessary condition (6).
Proof. Proposition 2:
We wish to compare rewards along the equilibrium path fa t g T t=0 with those derived following an arbitrary strategy fa t g T t=0 . As in the proof of Proposition 1 let a t , a t a t denote the local e¤ort deviation. Similarly, let
denote the resulting di¤erences in human capital at each date. The Brownian motions generated by the two e¤ort policies satisfy
The total rewards I a (t) from strategy a as of date 0 can therefore be decomposed as
Hence, the total reward from the arbitrary policy is given by
Let us focus on the third term on the right hand side
where the last equality follows from the de…nition of p and #. Changing the Brownian motion in the last term on the RHS and taking expectation yields
Hence we have
We know from the optimization property of a t that the …rst expectation term is at most equal to zero. On the other hand, the sign of the second expectation term is ambiguous. In order to bound it, we introduce the predictable process 
The expected bene…ts of following an alternative strategy can therefore be written as
which is negative when H ( ) is jointly concave. Given that the agent seeks to maximize expected returns, imposing concavity ensures that a dominates any alternative e¤ort path. Concavity is established considering the Hessian matrix of H ( )
which is negative semi-de…nite when 2u aa (w t ; a t ) # t , as stated in (10).
Proof. Proposition 3:
In order to simplify the algebra, we start by focusing on contracts which extract full e¤ort. Then we can omit actions a from the list of control and recast the principal's optimization problem as
subject to
i.e., the two promise-keeping constraints and the necessary condition under which income volatility is minimized.
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The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB hereafter) equation associated to the principal's optimal control problem reads 13 B (v; p) = min
where we have used (26) to express as a function of p and w: We seek a solution to the HJB equation of the following form
and guess that the optimal wage schedule is equal to
while the value of private information is given by
Under our premise that p is equal to v times a constant, we can eliminate p from the HJB equation and rewrite it as follows
The FOC with respect to wages reads
In order to obtain the expression of @ =@w, we replace our guess into (26) to obtain
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to wages yields
The FOC (32) for wages is therefore equivalent to
This equivalent to the following cubic equation for k
Notice that the relevant solution is given by the positive root because wages are not de…ned when k is negative. The existence and uniqueness of k are established below, in the proof of Corollary 1. We now verify that the dynamic programming equation is indeed satis…ed
Replacing our guess for B (v) on the left hand side, one …nds that the HJB holds true for all promised value v as long as
We still have to verify our guess (30) for p. Reinserting the Incentive Constraint (26) into the law of motion of p, we …nd that dp t = [( + + 1) p t + u a (w t ; 1)] dt + # t dZ t ;
Integrating this expression with respect to time yields
which, using our speci…cation (11) of the utility function and wage function (29), yields
The expression of E t [v s ] follows from the law of motion of v
Since t is square integrable, we have
Replacing this expression into (35), we …nally obtain
as conjectured in (30) :
We still have to establish that the contract maximizes the principal's pro…t. First notice that the pro…t function can be rewritten as follows 
Since the agent's incentive constraint is independent of the level of human capital, neither the principal's objective function nor its constraint depend on h, and Bellman's principle of optimality implies that it is equivalent to maximize (0; v t ) or (h t ; v t ). We can therefore rewrite the principal problem as 
(36) Furthermore, for each …xed v 2 R, the supremum with respect to wages is attained when w(v) = ln( kv)= + : For optimal e¤ort to be equal to one, we must have
To see that the inequality is indeed satis…ed, di¤erentiate the incentive constraint (26) to obtain @ =@a = @ =@w. Reinserting this equality along with u a ( ) = u w ( ) into the FOC (32) for wages, we …nd that (37) is strictly positive. Hence the supremum with respect to e¤ort is attained when a = 1, which completes the veri…cation argument.
Proof. Corollary 1: The …rst step consists in characterizing the cubic equation de…ning k
Observe that it can be rewritten as follows
We distinguish two cases: 1.
:
The function R(k) on the RHS of (39) is decreasing for all k 2 R + and R(0) = 0. By contrast, the function L (k) on the LHS of (39) is always increasing for all k 2 R + . Furthermore, since L (0) = and lim k!1 L (k) = 1; (39) always admits a unique positive real solution.
2.
The function R(k) on the RHS of (39) is not anymore decreasing for all k 2 R + : However, R(0) > L (0) still holds true and since lim k!1 R (k) < lim k!1 L (k), (39) always admits a positive real solution. Furthermore, these two inequalities imply that the number of positive solutions of (39) cannot be equal to two. This means that Having established the uniqueness of k; we proceed by showing that @k=@ < 0. Again, this is most easily established considering (39). Given that @L (k) =@ = 0 while @R (k) =@ = k 2 ( ) 2 (k + + 1) 2 < 0, the solution to (39) must be decreasing in : Figure 3 illustrates the comparative statics exercise. Finally it will prove useful to show that k < : Let k denote the positive root of (38) when = 0, i.e.,
Since @k=@ < 0 and 0, we have k < k. Assume for the sake of contradiction that k > ; then k 2 k > 0 and k 3 ( ) 2 + k 2 + k (1 ) > k 3 ( ) 2 + k > ; which contradicts the de…nition in (40) of k. Hence it holds true that > k > k for all 0: We can …nally prove Corollary 1. Di¤erentiating the incentive costs C with respect to 14 To establish this claim analytically, one can di¤erentiate L (k) and R (k) to obtain: L 00 (k) = ( ) 2 and R 00 (k) = 2 [ ( + 1)] 2 (k + + 1) 3 : Hence there exists a uniquek such that L 00 (k) ? R 00 (k) for all k ?k; which rules out the possibility that R (k) intersects twice L (k) from above.
k, we get
The positive sign follows from k < , and the corollary holds true since
Proof. Corollary 2: The su¢ ciency condition derived in Proposition 2 reads 2u aa (w t ; 1) # t : In order to derive the volatility coe¢ cient # of p, we use our …nding in the proof of Proposition 3 according to which p t = v t k= (k + + 1), to conclude that
We have also shown that u (w t ; 1) = kv t . Given that u aa (w t ; 1) = ( ) 2 u (w t ; 1), the su¢ cient condition is equivalent to 2u aa (w t ; 1) # t () 2 k (k + ) (k + + 1) 2 ;
which is obviously true for all 0:
Proof. Corollary 3: We …rst show that it is optimal to retire the agent when 1 + 1= ( + ) < C. Let R (v) denote the discounted cost of retiring an agent with promised value v. Since there is no need to motivate the agent, the principal perfectly insures her; in other words t = 0 and dv t =dt = (v t ) u(w t ; 0) = 0 for all t 0.
15 The second equality below follows from the de…nition of k as
27 Evaluating the principal's value function R associated to retirement yields
Retirement at date 0 dominates incentive provision when
as stated in Corollary 3. We still have to prove that there is no optimal stopping rule such that retirement follows a period with e¤ort exertion. We have shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that
where we have used the fact that h is deterministic to substitute it with t. Thus, if the agent is not immediately retired at date 0, we must have
showing that it can never be optimal to retire the agent at a future date.
